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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a simple model of the rights a government provides
its citizenry. Rights are treated as public goods and taken as primitives in agents
utility functions; each agent has preferences over the entire policy vector. We
model the interaction among citi-zens and the government as a game in which an
exogenous lobbying set makes contributions to the government to in uence policy formu-lation in the matter of rights. When examining contribution schedules
comprising truthful Nash strategies, we find that members of the lob-bying set obtain rights closer to their most-preferred bundle, while the rights of non-lobbyers
further diverge from their most-preferred bun-dle. Further, if the lobbying set
comprises the entire population, the government s allocation of rights does not
differ from the allocation achieved in the absence of contributions.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D72, D73, D78, H41, P48
Keywords: contributions, political economy, rights, voting
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Introduction

The rights a government allocates to an individual, whether positive in that
they permit some action or negative in that they protect the individual from
the trespasses of others, are goods. Further, rights have the character of
public goods insofar as the rights of specific individuals or groups of individuals are more broadly observed (read: consumed) by the entire citizenry.
By treating rights as goods, we open the door to economic analyses of their
formulation in, and distribution throughout, an economy.
The first issue any prospective model must tackle is the nature of individual preferences over rights. Historical struggles for rights, in the U.S. in
particular, suggest that individuals have a particular reference point for the
rights they desire from the government. For example, in the U.S. during the
19th century, women in numbers began to voice their desire for the right
to vote. This, however, was a part of a drive toward a larger set of rights
comprised in a notion of gender equality, a reference point far beyond the
limited sphere of equal rights to participate in voting. Because individuals
and groups appear to desire progress toward some ideal allocation of rights,
we will suppose that each individual has preferences over their own rights
that contain a (single) peak at their most-preferred rights. The Hotelling
(1929) location model of horizontal product differentiation is useful in this
regard. In the analysis that follows, we will interpret the linear interval of the
Hotelling model as a space representing an individual’s preferences over her
own rights. In this sense, then, an individual’s location on [0, 1] represents
her most-preferred right (or collection of rights) and the government chooses
the rights it provides its citizens by selecting each right’s (or collection’s)
location. Downs (1957) includes a related interpretation of the Hotelling
model where voters are distributed over an interval according to their political preferences and political parties select platform locations to maximize
the number of votes they receive.
The second issue any prospective model must confront is the public goods
nature of rights. In particular, an economic model of rights needs to specify how the rights of a particular individual or group affect the well-being
of others. We achieve this by supposing that rights have externalities of a
particular sort. More specifically, we develop a model of rights with externalities where each individual cares about her own rights and how others’
rights deviate from a maintained norm about what those rights should be.
A third, and final, issue any prospective model must face is the way in
2

which individuals or groups of individuals participate in the political process that determines the ultimate allocation of rights in an economy. In
reality, whether regarding their own rights or, often, the rights of others,
many individuals seek to influence government policy rather than playing
the passive role of political spectator. The pioneering work of Grossman and
Helpman (1994) provides a framework to formalize these ideas. In this model
of special-interest politics, some individuals belong to lobby groups that use
contributions to influence government policy-making. We adopt the Grossman and Helpman (1994) framework and synthesize it with the Hotelling
(1929) location model to arrive at a model of rights with externalities and
contributions. A preliminary model of pure rights without externalities will
aid in formalizing the ideas discussed thus far.
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Preliminaries: A Simple Model of Rights

Consider a set I of individuals (each i) populating an economy. Further, suppose that we may partition I into two sets A and B, where card(A) = a > 0,
card(B) = b > 0, A ∩ B = ∅, and A ∪ B = I.1 Imposing restrictions on
the relationship between a and b is not necessary for the subsequent analysis. In the discussion that follows, we consider the individuals in sets A
and B to comprise unique “groups” in the economy. Following Hotelling
(1929), we suppose that the unit interval represents a continuum of personal
characteristics and an individual’s location on it represents their preference
for a particular right granted by the government; i.e., an individual located
at x has a most-preferred right located at x. Groups emerge as masses of
the population find themselves sharing a particular location on the interval.
Thus, by modeling the allocation of rights using a model of location, we depart from Hotelling (1929) by supposing that a discrete distribution function
describes the distribution of individuals over the interval rather than a continuous distribution function. In particular, we assume that the individuals
in group A are located at rAA = 0 and that the individuals in group B are
located at rBB = 1 as shown in Figure 1. By employing such a location
model for the granting of rights, we are effectively assuming that we can dis1

Note that sets A and B are disjoint. The ideas central to the models we develop in
this paper extend to settings including n such sets of individuals and we will discuss this
further as a topic for future research. For now, we restrict the analysis to two groups for
simplicity.

3

Figure 1: Most-Preferred Own-Rights for Members of Groups A and B
tinguish between individuals or groups of individuals by some unidimensional
criterion (e.g., race in the matter of civil rights or sexual preference in the
matter of same-sex marriage). Such a formulation seems reasonable in that
history affords numerous examples of individuals banding together in groups
to pursue the institution of a right that they believe is relevant to them.
We assume that individuals within a particular group have the same
preferences represented by the utility functions
UA = xA − δAA (rA − rAA )2

(1)

UB = xB − δBB (rB − rBB )2

(2)

and
for members of group A and B, respectively. In the above formulation, each
individual cares about their consumption of a private good (xi ) and the location of the right (ri ) granted to the group. We interpret δii > 0 as reflecting
how strongly an individual feels about the way in which her right deviates
from her ideal point. Note that group A’s ideal location for its right is
rAA = 0 while group B’s ideal location for its right is rBB = 1; rights deviating from a particular group’s ideal point causes disutility for its constituent
individuals. This is the familiar interpretation of transportation costs as
disutility of distance first mentioned in Hotelling (1929) and included in any
model of location that treats the location space as representing individual
preferences.2 Further, note that we represent each individual’s disutility of
distance as quadratic. Assuming that an individual’s utility decreases at an
increasing rate as her rights deviate further from her ideal point seems reasonable if one supposes that individuals would be increasingly unhappy with
a state of affairs (here, the allocation of a personal right, or a collection of
rights) differing from the ideal they envision. Moreover, several real-world
2

For an introductory review of economic models of location, see Tirole (2003, Chapter

7).
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examples of individuals struggling toward the realization of a right in the
face of increasing costs suggest that the formulation of utility as above in
equations (1) and (2) is appropriate.3
Each individual faces a budget given by
yi = xi + τ, i = A, B,

(3)

where yi is an individual’s exogenous income depending upon whether she
is a member of group A or B and τ is the tax an individual pays to the
government. We are assuming that individuals belonging to a particular
group have the same income and that all individuals pay the same (lumpsum) tax to the government regardless of their group affiliation. We envision
the tax as serving to defray the administrative costs the government faces
when providing and protecting the rights of its citizens. Perhaps the fact that
each individual makes such a transfer to the government makes it reasonable
to suppose that they would demand the government to provide them rights
of some sort.
As a first approximation, suppose that the government selects an allocation of rights to a maximize a Benthamite social welfare function; this
problem is equivalent to the government minimizing the aggregate disutility of distance subject to its budget. The government selects (rA , rB ) to
maximize
X
X
Ui
Ui +
W =
i∈A

i∈B

= a[yA − τ − δAA (rA − rAA )2 ] + b[yB − τ − δBB (rB − rBB )2 ]

(4)

subject to
(a + b)τ = c(rA + rB )

(5)

where c > 0 is the government’s marginal cost of setting its rights policy.
The first-order conditions are
∂W
= −2aδAA (rA − rAA ) − c = 0
(6)
∂rA
and

∂W
= −2bδBB (rB − rBB ) − c = 0.
∂rB

3

(7)

The civil rights movement in the United States in the 1950s through the 1960s provides
a particularly vivid example of a group of individuals pursuing a gradual movement toward
an ideal set of rights often at increasing costs to themselves.
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The solutions are r˜A = rAA − c/2aδAA and r˜B = rBB − c/2bδBB . But for
the cost to the government of setting its rights policy, each individual would
receive the rights she most prefers. In other words, abstracting from the
costliness of formulating policy–setting c = 0 above–the government would
allocate “personalized rights” to members of groups A and B by locating each
group’s rights at the group’s own location on the unit interval, (r˜A , r˜B )=(rAA ,
rBB ). This result is not entirely surprising as the best the government can
do in this case is to eliminate any disutility of distance an individual may
experience and it can do so without any cost; so, the government provides
each distinct group of individuals with the rights they perceive as ideal.
However, it must be the case that no real-world government grants such
personalized rights because under such a policy we would not observe the
(often heated) political exchanges over the allocation of personal rights that
we do in reality. Further, it seems unreasonable to suppose that, in the
majority of cases, it is solely resource constraints keeping individuals from
obtaining the rights they most prefer. Such a model also fails to capture the
ways in which individuals can influence how the government allocates rights.
The reality that we envision above ignores the fundamentally public nature
of individual rights. That is, individual rights have the character of public
goods in that, when the government provides them, the broader population
consumes the rights despite their particular relevance (read: value) to a
particular group of individuals. In the subsequent discussion, we consider
this point at length.

3

A Model of Rights with Externalities

Individual rights have a public goods character that any economic analysis cannot fail to ignore. Although a particular right may be relevant for
a specific individual or group of individuals–for example, women’s right to
vote as codified in the 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or their
right to have an abortion from the 1973 Roe v. Wade U.S. Supreme Court
decision–it is more broadly consumed by the entire citizenry upon its enactment. Thus, in the language of the location model we developed in the
last section, the government’s chosen location for a particular group’s right
affects the welfare of the members of the other group. In this sense, then,
the location and consumption of rights produces an externality. Such externalities may have negative effects on the utilities of the third parties to
6

the location and consumption of a right. That is, the location of the rights
of one individual or group of individuals may enter negatively into the utility function(s) representing the preferences of another individual or group.
Preferences exhibiting malice and envy as discussed by Brennan (1973) and
further developed by Mui (1995) operate in such a case.4 Of course, we may
have the opposite case of positive externalities as well. Though such a case
provides a somewhat sunnier view of the world, we do not consider it in the
discussion that follows. If the rights of other individuals generated solely
positive externalities to third parties, we would not witness the continual
struggles of individuals and groups for particular rights throughout history.
If it were the case that rights produced purely beneficial externalities, then
the government would not have much of a problem to solve; if maximizing
aggregate welfare, it would simply provide personalized rights to all individuals and groups located at the different points on [0, 1]. Again, however,
experience suggests that the matter is not so simple and free of discord.
A recent example of public and political conflict over a particular right
may prove instructive. In the U.S., the proposed right for same-sex marriage
has been, and continues to be, a topic of intense political debate. Proponents
tout the issue as part of an ongoing struggle for the civil rights due gay
individuals, (the strongest) opponents seek a constitutional ban on samesex marriage, and moderates seek civil unions but not recognized marriage
as a compromise. Opponents of same-sex marriage cite that the enactment
of such a right would run against their perceived moral values and, further,
would ruin the value of their own (heterosexual) marriages. Clearly, then, the
issue of same-sex marriage is an example where the allocation of a particular
right seems to detract from the welfare of certain members of society. This
scenario fits into the model we developed above in the following stylized way:
heterosexuals (group A) have the right to marry, rA is located with them at
rAA = 0; gays and lesbians (group B) do not have the right to marry, the
government has not yet located rB = rBB = 1, or something “close” to it, on
the interval; and, further, rB enters into the utilities of group A members in
some negative fashion.
We can enrich the model from the previous section by extending it toward
the allocation of rights with externalities. In doing so, we synthesize the
4
Falk et al. (2001) as well as Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) refer to such preferences as
“spiteful.” Falk et al. (2001) provides experimental evidence on the presence of spitefulness
in the interactions of subjects participating in laboratory games.
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notions of malice and envy in Brennan (1973) with the commentary of Ostrom
(2000), Fehr and Gächter (2000b), and Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) on social
preferences and social norms. Here, for the same reasons as we argued above,
we suppose that the rights allocated to other groups enter negatively into
the utility functions representing the preferences of members of a particular
group. Further, we interpret a social norm not as a behavioral rule but as a
reference point for each group’s preferences. The formulation of the utilities
of individuals in groups A and B, respectively, make these ideas more explicit:
UA = xA − δAA (rA − rAA )2 − δAB (rB − rAB )2

(8)

UB = xB − δBB (rB − rBB )2 − δBA (rA − rBA )2 .

(9)

and
Here, xi , ri , and δii have the same interpretations as above in the previous
section. The novelty lies in rij and δij > 0, i 6= j. We interpret rij as the
norm that members of group i hold about the location of the rights of group
j members. For example, if the government provides a right to members of
group A that differs from group B’s norm rBA , then the members of group B
suffer a disutility. With the same arguments as we offered above, we suppose
that deviations from the norm enter the utility functions in a quadratic way.
We interpret δij to reflect how strongly members of group i feel about the
extent to which the rights allocated to members of group j deviate from the
group i norm. Finally, we note that each individual faces the budget given
above in equation (3).
We again suppose that the government selects an allocation of rights to
maximize a Benthamite social welfare function; this problem is equivalent to
the government minimizing the aggregate disutility of distance subject to its
budget. The government selects (rA , rB ) to maximize
X
X
W =
Ui +
Ui
i∈A

i∈B

= a[yA − τ − δAA (rA − rAA )2 − δAB (rB − rAB )2 ]
+ b[yB − τ − δBB (rB − rBB )2 − δBA (rA − rBA )2 ]

(10)

subject to its budget given above in equation (5). The first-order conditions
are
∂W
= −2aδAA (rA − rAA ) − 2bδBA (rA = rBA ) − c = 0
(11)
∂rA
8

and

∂W
= −2aδAB (rB − rAB ) − 2bδBB (rB − rBB ) − c = 0.
(12)
∂rB
Solving the first-order conditions for rA and rB , we obtain the solutions
2aδAA rAA + 2bδBA rBA − c
∗
=
rA
2aδAA + 2bδBA
2bδBA rBA − c
(13)
=
2aδAA + 2bδBA
and
2aδAB rAB + 2bδBB rBB − c
∗
rB
=
2aδAB + 2bδBB
2aδAB rAB + 2bδBB − c
=
.
(14)
2aδAB + 2bδBB
∗
∗
differs from rAA and that rB
differs from
It is immediately apparent that rA
rBB due to both the government’s resource constraint and the norms each
group holds about the rights allocated to the other group. In this scenario,
the government accounts for individual own-rights preferences and the externalities arising from the way in which the allocated rights deviate from
the perceived norms individuals hold. Thus, we do not observe personalized
rights in the sense discussed earlier unless the government’s policy-making is
costless and the most-preferred rights of one group exactly coincide with the
norms held by the other group. Such felicitous agreement, however, seems
to fly in the face of historical fact, thus we will continue to maintain that the
two groups continue to “disagree” in the sense that rAB < 1 and rBA > 0.
Our model of rights with externalities is substantially richer than the
preliminary model lacking such qualities. As we argued above, a model that
ignores the public goods character of the rights a government allocates to its
citizens is unsatisfactory. Modeling rights as having negative externalities in
the form of malice and envy conceived by Brennan (1973) has the advantage
of pushing our extremely simple framework closer to explaining the stylized
facts history provides on individual and group struggles for rights. However,
we can extend the model of rights with externalities further into a setting
that provides what is arguably a more realistic account of government policymaking. Specifically, we build upon the seminal contribution of Grossman
and Helpman (1994) on special-interest politics. This line of research envisions diverse lobby groups contributing to the government with the aim of
influencing policy formulation.
9

4

A Model of Rights with Externalities and
Contributions

The above model of rights with externalities may be instructive, but remains
fundamentally limited. In particular, the model developed in the previous
section views the citizenry as passive observers of the government’s decision
on the allocation of rights in the economy. This is clearly unrealistic; it is
clear that individuals and groups often seek to influence how their government formulates policy, and frequently do so quite vocally and vigorously.
Individuals and groups may use contributions to the government, particular campaign funds, or political action committees (PACs) to influence the
policy-making process. The work of Bernheim and Whinston (1986a, 1986b)
formalizes these ideas. The Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) model of common agency envisions the scenario of several principals competing with one
another to influence the behavior of a single agent. In the Bernheim and
Whinston (1986b) menu auction model, suppliers seek to influence the actions of an auctioneer by submitting menus of offers contingent upon the
auctioneer’s selected action.
The seminal work of Grossman and Helpman (1994) extends these ideas
to the political arena in which the government is a common agent and some
of its citizens form lobby groups and contribute to influence the government’s trade policy. More specifically, members of each lobby group own a
sector-specific factor and seek trade subsidies for their sector and taxes on
other (unorganized) sectors. In this model, the government’s policy-making
is the equilibrium of a two-stage game. In the first stage, the lobby groups
make contributions to the government taking all other groups’ contributions
as given and anticipating the government’s policy response to the contributions. In the second stage, the government selects a vector of trade taxes and
subsidies to maximize its objective function (a weighted sum of contributions
and aggregate welfare gross of contributions) and payoffs are realized.
While the model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) focuses specifically on
trade policy, it has become a “workhorse” model for understanding the ways
in which citizens and lobby groups sway policy outcomes in their favor by
contributing to the government. Grossman and Helpman (1996) provide an
explicit microeconomic foundation to their earlier model of common agency
and contributions. Dixit (1996) and Dixit et al. (1997) extend the modeling framework to endogenous commodity taxation. Aidt (1998) applies the
10

model to the formulation of an environmental policy of output and input
taxes-cum-subsidies in which some lobby groups seek to curb pollution. Finally, Dharmapala (1999) utilizes the common agency framework to analyze
the impact of legislative structure on the government’s choice of tax expenditures versus direct subsidies in response to contributing lobbies.
The Grossman and Helpman (1994) model of special-interest politics
presents a tractable and widely used framework for understanding how individuals and groups may affect government policy. Thus, we synthesize a
simplified version of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) framework with our
model of rights with externalities. As before, the utilities of members of
groups A and B, respectively, are:
UA = xA − δAA (rA − rAA )2 − δAB (rB − rAB )2

(15)

UB = xB − δBB (rB − rBB )2 − δBA (rA − rBA )2 .

(16)

and
We assume that only members of group A choose to contribute to the government while members of group B do not. Thus, the budgets for members
of each group are:
yA = xA + τ + CA (rA , rB )
(17)
and
yB = xB + τ

(18)

where CA (rA , rB ) represents the contributions each member of group A makes
to the government contingent upon its choice of rights (rA , rB ). Note that,
as is the case with all of the models reviewed above, our model says nothing
about how group A forms itself into a contributing lobby group seeking to
influence the government. We quite simply suppose that group A’s members have found some way to overcome the free-riding problem that would
shatter such collective action. Though, we do note that the work of numerous researchers–Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Ostrom (2000), Fehr and Gächter
(2000a, 2000b), and Fehr and Fischbacher (2002)–attests to the theoretical and empirical plausibility of “norm-using” individuals whose behavior
departs from the standard assumption of rational self-interestedness and
thereby overcome the free-riding problem to attain cooperation in public
goods situations both theoretical and experimental.
Following the standard assumption made in models of common agency
contributions, we suppose that the government selects rights to maximize a
11

weighted sum contributions and aggregate welfare. Thus, the government’s
problem is to select (rA , rB ) to maximize
X
G=
Ci (rA , rB ) + θW
(19)
i∈A

subject to
(a + b)τ = c(rA + rB )

(20)

where W is aggregate welfare gross of contributions as defined above in equation (10) and θ ≥ 0 is the weight the government places on the value of
social welfare relative to contributions (from group A). We make the further
assumption that the contribution schedules tendered by members of group A
are differentiable and everywhere truthful in the sense that the contributions
from members of group A exactly reflect the added benefit (above and beyond some baseline utility level) from the government’s policy choice.5 For
the policy vector r = (rA , rB ), contribution schedules that are differentiable
and everywhere truthful feature ∇r Ci (r) = ∇r Ui (r) for all i ∈ A, the lobbying set. Under such conditions, the government’s problem becomes one of
selecting rights to maximize a weighted sum of utilities given by
X
X
X
G0 =
Ui + θ(
Ui +
Ui )
i∈A

i∈A

i∈B

= a(1 + θ)[yA − τ − δAA (rA − rAA )2 − δAB (rB − rAB )2 ]
+ bθ[yB − τ − δBB (rB − rBB )2 − δBA (rA − rBA )2 ]

(21)

subject to its budget given above in equation (20). The first-order conditions
are
∂G0
= −2a(1 + θ)δAA (rA − rAA ) − 2bθδBA (rA − rBA ) − (1 + θ)c = 0 (22)
∂rA
and
∂G0
= −2a(1 + θ)δAB (rB − rAB ) − 2bθδBB (rB − rBB ) − (1 + θ)c = 0 (23)
∂rB
5

Such assumptions are standard and, furthermore, are reasonable given the present
environment of complete information. For more on “local truthfulness” and “truthful
strategies” more generally, see Bernheim and Whinston (1986b), Grossman and Helpman
(1994), and Dixit et al. (1997).
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which we solve for rA and rB and obtain the solutions
2a(1 + θ)δAA rAA + 2bθδBA rBA − (1 + θ)c
2a(1 + θ)δAA + 2bθδBA
2bθδBA rBA − (1 + θ)c
=
2a(1 + θ)δAA + 2bθδBA

∗∗
=
rA

(24)

and
2a(1 + θ)δAB rAB + 2bθδBB rBB − (1 + θ)c
2a(1 + θ)δAB + 2bθδBB
2a(1 + θ)δAB rAB + 2bθδBB − (1 + θ)c
.
=
2a(1 + θ)δAB + 2bθδBB

∗∗
rB
=

(25)

The solutions possess insightful comparative statics properties, which we
will review in what follows. Recall the assumption of ceteris paribus implicit
in our comparative statics exercise, and note that members of group A have
most-preferred own-rights located at rAA = 0 and group B at rBB = 1.
As the norm group B holds about the rights allotted group A increases,
the rights allocated to the members of group A diverge further from their
most-preferred location at rAA ,
∗∗
2bθδBA
∂rA
=
> 0.
∂rBA
2a(1 + θ)δAA + 2bθδBA

Increasing disagreement over the rights the government provides to group A
leads to a set of own-rights less-desired by members of group A. An increase
in the number of individuals belonging to group A moves the group’s rights
closer to rAA ,
∗∗
∂rA
−2(1 + θ)δAA [2bθδBA rBA − (1 + θ)c]
=
< 0.
∂a
[2a(1 + θ)δAA + 2bθδBA ]2

As group A increases in size relative to group B, its representation becomes
more effective in the sense that the government selects a set of own-rights
relatively more favorable for members of the group. In a similar fashion, as
the number of individuals belonging to group B increases, the rights allocated
to group A depart further from rAA ,
∗∗
∂rA
4a(θ + θ2 )δAA δBA rBA + 2c(θ + θ2 )δBA
=
> 0.
∂b
[2a(1 + θ)δAA + 2bθδBA ]2

13

When the members of group A exhibit relatively more intense preferences
over how their own rights deviate from those they prefer most, the government locates rights closer to them,
∗∗
−2a(1 + θ)[2bθδBA rBA − (1 + θ)c]
∂rA
=
< 0.
∂δAA
[2a(1 + θ)δAA + 2bθδBA ]2

When the members of group B exhibit relatively stronger preferences over
how group A’s rights deviate from the group B norm, the rights allocated to
group A diverge further from rAA ,
∗∗
∂rA
4ab(θ + θ2 )δAA rBA + 2bc(θ + θ2 )
=
> 0.
∂δBA
[2a(1 + θ)δAA + 2bθδBA ]2

Lastly, the rights the government provides to group A further diverge from
their members’ most-preferred location, rAA , as the government places a
heavier weight on aggregate social welfare relative to contributions from
group A; that is,
∗∗
4abδAA δBA rBA + 2bcδBA
∂rA
=
> 0.
∂θ
[2a(1 + θ)δAA + 2bθδBA ]2

This is not entirely surprising for, as θ increases, members of group A receive
relatively less weight in the government’s objective than do members of group
B; that is, ∂[(1 + θ)/θ]/∂θ < 0.
∗∗
Similar comparative statics results obtain for rB
, the rights the government provides to members of group B. As the norm group A holds about the
rights allocated to group B increases, the rights allocated to the members of
group B move closer to their most-preferred own-rights at rBB ,
∗∗
∂rB
2a(1 + θ)δAB
=
> 0.
∂rAB
2a(1 + θ)δAB + 2bθδBB

Decreasing disagreement over the rights allotted group B leads to a more
favorable set of own-rights for members of group B. An increase in the number
of individuals belonging to group A moves group B’s rights away from rBB ,
∗∗
∂rB
4b(θ + θ2 )δAB δBB (rAB − 1) + 2c(1 + θ)2 δAB
< 0.
=
∂a
[2a(1 + θ)δAB + 2bθδBB ]2

As group A increases in size relative to group B, the government selects a set
of own-rights relatively more favorable for members of group B. In a similar
14

manner, as the number of individuals belonging to group B increases, the
rights allocated to group B move toward rBB ,
∗∗
∂rB
4aθδAB δBB (1 − rAB ) + 2c(θ + θ2 )δBB
=
> 0.
∂b
[2a(1 + θ)δAB + 2bθδBB ]2

When the members of group B exhibit relatively stronger preferences over
how their own rights deviate from those they most prefer, the government
locates rights closer to them,
∗∗
4ab(θ + θ2 )δAB (1 − rAB ) + 2bc(θ + θ2 )
∂rB
=
> 0.
∂δBB
[2a(1 + θ)δAB + 2bθδBB ]2

When the members of group A exhibit relatively more intense preferences
over how group B’s rights deviate from the group A norm, the rights allocated
to group B diverge further from rBB ,
∗∗
∂rB
4ab(θ + θ2 )δBB (rAB − 1) + 2ac(1 + θ)2
=
< 0.
∂δAB
[2a(1 + θ)δAB + 2bθδBB ]2

Lastly, the rights the government provides to group B move toward their
members’ most-preferred location, rBB , as the government places a heavier
weight on aggregate social welfare relative to contributions from group A;
that is,
∗∗
4abδAB δBB (1 − rAB ) + 2bcδBB
∂rB
=
> 0.
∂θ
[2a(1 + θ)δAB + 2bθδBB ]2
Again, this is not entirely surprising for, as θ increases, members of group B
receive relatively more weight in the government’s objective than do members
of group A; that is, ∂[θ/(1 + θ)]/∂θ > 0.
It is worthwhile to make three concluding remarks. It is clear that if
members of both groups A and B contributed in the manner we described
above, they would effectively neutralize one another and we would have the
∗
∗
results of the prior section found in the expressions for rA
and rB
in equations
(13) and (14), respectively. That is, if the entire population contributed to
the government, it would allocate rights in the same manner as if no one
contributed.
Do members of the lobbying set–in this case, members of group A–obtain
policy that is closer to their most-preferred allocation of (rAA , rAB ) relative
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to when they do not contribute to the government? The answer is yes. First,
use equations (13) and (24) to write
∗∗
rA
2bθδBA rBA − (1 + θ)c
2aδAA + 2bδBA
=
×
.
∗
rA
2bδBA rBA − c
2a(1 + θ)δAA + 2bθδBA
∗∗
∗
It is easy to see that rA
/rA
< 1 so long as −c < 2aδAA rBA , which is always
∗∗
∗
< rA
, and
the case since c > 0 and 2aδAA rBA > 0. Thus, it is clear that rA
∗∗
∗
so rA is closer to rAA = 0 than is rA . Second, use equations (14) and (25) to
write
2bδBB (1 − rAB ) − c
∗
,
rB
− rAB =
2aδAB + 2bδBB
2bθδBB (1 − rAB ) − (1 + θ)c
∗∗
,
rB
− rAB =
2a(1 + θ)δAB + 2bθδBB

and
∗∗
rB
− rAB
2bθδBB (1 − rAB ) − (1 + θ)c
2aδAB + 2bδBB
=
×
.
∗
rB − rAB
2bδBB (1 − rAB ) − c
2a(1 + θ)δAB + 2bθδBB
∗∗
∗
− rAB )/(rB
− rAB ) < 1 so long as −c < 2aδAB (1 −
It is easy to see that (rB
rAB ), which is always the case since c > 0 and 2aδAB (1 − rAB ) > 0. Thus,
∗∗
∗
∗∗
it is clear that (rB
− rAB ) < (rB
− rAB ), and so rB
is closer to rAB than
∗
is rB . Thus, when members of group A contribute to the government to
∗∗
∗∗
),
, rB
influence its policy-making, they obtain an allocation of rights, (rA
that is relatively closer to their most-preferred allocation of (rAA , rAB ) than
the allocation that emerges when they do not.
Do members of group B–in this case, individuals outside of the lobbying
set–obtain policy that further diverges from their most-preferred allocation
of (rBA , rBB ) relative to when no one contributes to the government? The
answer is yes. First, use equations (13) and (24) to write
∗
rA
− rBA =

∗∗
rA
− rBA =

−2aδAA rBA − c
,
2aδAA + 2bδBA

−2aδAA rBA − 2aθδAA rBA − (1 + θ)c
,
2aδAA + 2aθδAA + 2bθδBA

and
∗
rA
− rBA
2aδAA rBA + c
2aδAA + 2aθδAA + 2bθδBA
=
×
.
∗∗
rA − rBA
2aδAA rBA + 2aθδAA rBA + (1 + θ)c
2aδAA + 2bδBA
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∗
∗∗
It is easy to see that (rA
− rBA )/(rA
− rBA ) < 1 so long as 2aδAA rBA + c > 0,
which is always the case since 2aδAA rBA > 0 and c > 0. Thus, it is clear that
∗
∗∗
∗∗
∗
(rA
− rBA ) < (rA
− rBA ), and so rA
diverges further from rBA than does rA
.
Second, use equations (14) and (25) to write
∗∗
2a(1 + θ)δAB rAB + 2bθδBB − (1 + θ)c
2aδAB + 2bδBB
rB
=
×
.
∗
rB
2aδAB rAB + 2bδBB − c
2a(1 + θ)δAB + 2bθδBB
∗∗
∗
It is easy to see that rB
/rB
< 1 so long as 2aδAB (rAB − 1) < c, which is
always the case since 2aδAB (rAB − 1) < 0 and c > 0. Thus, it is clear that
∗
∗∗
∗
∗∗
rB
. Thus, when
< rB
, and so rB
diverges further from rBB = 1 than does rB
members of group A contribute to the government to influence its policymaking, members of group B, the non-lobbying set, obtain an allocation of
∗∗
∗∗
rights, (rA
, rB
), that diverges further from their most-preferred allocation
of (rBA , rBB ) than the allocation that emerges when no one contributes to
the government.

5

A Brief Remark on Voting and Rights

In all of the models we discussed above, we did not include an explicit treatment of the voting processes likely at work in the allocation of rights throughout an economy. A fuller model of rights, however, would likely benefit from
enhanced richness by including an analysis of how individuals’ voting behavior determines the rights a government grants to its citizens. The often
animated and vocal political struggles for rights suggest that voting is one
of many ways individuals or groups of individuals may strive to influence
the rights allotted them by their government. Here, we briefly discuss an
application of a well-known model of voting to the model of rights with externalities.
Suppose again, as above, that the individuals of groups A and B have
preferences represented by the utility functions
UA = xA − δAA (rA − rAA )2 − δAB (rB − rAB )2

(26)

UB = xB − δBB (rB − rBB )2 − δBA (rA − rBA )2

(27)

and
respectively; and, each individual faces a budget given by
yi = xi + τ, i = A, B.
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(28)

Note that each individual has preferences that are single-peaked in rights, rA
and rB . In particular, members of group A have a peak at (rAA , rAB ) and
members of group B have a peak at (rBA , rBB ).
The median voter theorem applies to the model of rights with externalities
when we assume that each member of group A and B has the right to vote
and exercises it in pairwise majoritarian voting over rights. Note that at
the outset we assumed that group A was of size a and group B of size b.
Suppose that, without loss of generality, a > b. Thus, in this case, a member
of group A is the median voter, and the ultimate outcome of our stylized
voting process is an allocation of rights that maximizes
UA = xA − δAA (rA − rAA )2 − δAB (rB − rAB )2

(29)

yA = xA + τ

(30)

(a + b)τ = c(rA + rB ).

(31)

subject to
and
The first-order conditions are
c
∂UA
=0
= −2δAA (rA − rAA ) −
∂rA
a+b

(32)

and

∂UA
c
= −2δAB (rB − rAB ) −
=0
∂rB
a+b
and the solutions are clearly

(33)

r˜˜A = rAA −

c
2(a + b)δAA

(34)

r˜˜B = rAB −

c
.
2(a + b)δAB

(35)

and

In this scenario, the median voter theorem has group A dominating the
political agenda in the matter of individual rights. Thus, when we abstract
from the government’s cost of policy-making, it is not entirely surprising that
the members of group A obtain their most-preferred rights and assert their
norm about the rights allocated to members of group B as the status quo;
that is, for c = 0, (r˜˜A , r˜˜B )=(rAA , rAB ).
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6

Conclusion and Directions for Further Research

The models we develop throughout this paper are clearly stylized, and extremely simplified, pictures of a more complex reality. In fact, even our
adaptation of the modeling framework developed in Grossman and Helpman (1994) is a grossly simplified version of a model of common agency and
contributions in that we divide the economy into two distinct groups of individuals, each with homogeneous preferences and budgets, and explicitly
consider a rather particular case where only one group contributes to the
government to influence its (locational) choice of the rights it allocates to
both groups. A useful direction for further research would generalize the
above framework to n such groups seeking particular rights and experiencing
externalities from the rights the government provides to other groups. A
further extension could consider an organized fraction of the n groups contributing to the government to influence policy and the impact that would
have on the distribution of rights in an economy. Ultimately, it will likely
prove useful to adapt the above n groups formulation to diverse preferences
and budgets both within- and across-groups of individuals in our locational
model of rights.
The analysis above is a merely a first step toward the goal of a more
general economic model of rights. Conflicts over how governments provide
rights to various individuals and groups have been, and will likely continue
to be, a centerpiece of socio-political debate and deliberation. Thus, any
steps taken toward enhancing our under-standing of the key issues at play
in the allocation of rights will pay off handsomely. To better understand, for
example, how governments allocate rights to their (often diverse) citizenry,
how individuals form norms about the rights provided to them and to others,
and how, as well as why, individual citizens organize in groups to obtain the
rights they desire will bolster both the contemporary and future relevance of
economics (and the social sciences more generally) in ongoing policy debates
over effectively managing the diverse forces at work in any free society.
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